Pakistan’s military has built an extensive economic network that reaches well beyond its formal defence role, with military-linked institutions involved in real estate, agriculture, logistics, banking, manufacturing and other commercial activities. Much of the system operates through laws, government notifications, welfare foundations and established administrative arrangements, making the scale of the military’s economic interests difficult to assess from public records alone.
The network has developed over decades. Its origins can be traced to the land and cantonment structures inherited from British rule, when agricultural land in Punjab was distributed to soldiers and officers according to rank. After independence, similar arrangements remained in place and gradually expanded into housing, welfare enterprises and commercial ventures.
Scholar Ayesha Siddiqa described this broader system as “Milbus” in her 2007 book Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy. The term refers to military-controlled capital and business activity associated with serving and retired officers that operates outside the conventional defence budget and, in her analysis, is subject to limited civilian accountability.
Land remains one of the most visible elements of the system. In January 2017, Pakistan’s military confirmed that former army chief General Raheel Sharif had been allotted 90 acres of agricultural land near Lahore after his retirement. The military said the allocation followed constitutional provisions and established procedures and that similar arrangements applied to army chiefs.
The case highlighted how military rank can be linked to access to state land. It also drew attention to the wider network of Defence Housing Authorities, which operate in cities including Lahore, Karachi, Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Multan, Gujranwala and Quetta.
The housing authorities acquire and develop land for residential and commercial schemes. The supplied material describes a system in which land is acquired at government-assessed rates, developed into higher-value projects and allocated to military personnel and others. It also raises questions about independent oversight of DHA finances and land distribution.
The Islamabad DHA framework, for example, reserves a share of plots for families of soldiers killed in service, war-wounded personnel and junior ranks. The absence of comprehensive publicly available independent audits makes it difficult to assess how such allocations are implemented or distributed.
Agriculture has become another area of military involvement. Under the Green Pakistan Initiative, the armed forces have taken a leading role in plans for large-scale corporate farming on state land. The project has a stated potential reach of up to 4.8 million acres across Punjab and Sindh.
More than 52,000 acres in Sindh were earmarked for military-linked corporate entities under long-term leases, while a proposed transfer involving 45,000 acres in Punjab became the subject of court proceedings. The military has argued that food security is a component of national security, providing a rationale for its involvement in agricultural development.
The issue has historical precedents. In Okara, tenant families cultivated around 17,000 acres of government land for generations under crop-sharing arrangements. Around 2000, efforts to replace the system with short-term cash leases led to protests, arrests and blockades. The army later acknowledged before the National Commission for Human Rights that the land belonged to the Punjab government and was being used by the military to grow fodder.
Military-linked economic activity also extends through a group of welfare foundations. The Fauji Foundation, established in 1954, has developed interests in fertiliser, cement, energy, food and banking. The Army Welfare Trust, Shaheen Foundation and Bahria Foundation have also built businesses across various sectors.
These organisations maintain that their commercial activities support welfare programmes for veterans, serving personnel and military families. The Fauji Foundation, for example, says most of its profits are directed towards welfare. Its legal status, however, differs from that of publicly listed companies, resulting in different disclosure requirements.
The National Logistics Corporation provides another example of the military’s economic expansion. Created in 1978 to address a port crisis in Karachi, it continued operating after the emergency and developed into a large freight, construction and logistics organisation. A Senate committee recommended in 2014 that military freight operations be shifted back to Pakistan Railways, but the recommendation did not result in a transfer.
The economic interests associated with the military have also drawn scrutiny over the wealth of senior officers and their families. In 2022, investigative outlet Fact Focus reported substantial growth in the assets of relatives of former army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa during his tenure. The military rejected the reporting as misleading, and the claims have not been established by a court.
A separate Fact Focus investigation reported business interests involving relatives of Lieutenant General Asim Saleem Bajwa, including companies registered in several countries. Bajwa denied wrongdoing and offered to provide financial records. The episode highlighted differences between Pakistan and some foreign jurisdictions in the availability of corporate ownership information.
Retirement can also lead to continued access to senior positions in the state. Former military officers have been appointed to ministries, state-owned companies, regulatory bodies and diplomatic posts. Individual appointments are generally announced separately, but the absence of a consolidated public register makes it difficult to determine the overall scale of former officers’ presence in civilian institutions.
The result is a system that combines military welfare, state land, commercial enterprises and post-retirement opportunities. Supporters of the model point to its role in financing services for veterans and military families. Critics have focused on the limited availability of independent information about landholdings, business finances, allocations and appointments.
Greater transparency would make it easier to assess the scale of the military’s economic role. Public records covering military landholdings, rank-based land allocations, independently audited welfare foundations and post-retirement appointments would provide a clearer picture of how the system operates.
Pakistan’s military economy is therefore not confined to a handful of companies or housing schemes. It has developed into a broad institutional network spanning property, agriculture, logistics, finance and industry. Its continued expansion has made the armed forces a major economic actor, while questions over transparency and civilian oversight remain central to the debate surrounding its role in Pakistan’s economy.
